2 edition of Reconsidering contractual liability and the incentive to reveal information found in the catalog.
Reconsidering contractual liability and the incentive to reveal information
Lucian A. Bebchuk
|Other titles||Contractual liability and the incentive to reveal information|
|Statement||Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Steven Shavell.|
|Series||NBER working paper series -- working paper 7106, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 7106.|
|Contributions||Shavell, Steven, 1946-, National Bureau of Economic Research.|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||9 p. ;|
DMCA Takedown Notice "OCILLA" redirects here. For the town in Georgia, United States, see Ocilla, contains provisions that allow a copyright owner to force an OSP to reveal identifying information about the user who allegedly infringed the owner’s copyright, through the use of a subpoena issued by a federal court at the owner’s request.
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Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Steven Shavell. NBER Working Paper No. Issued in May NBER Program(s):Law and Economics In an earlier work, we analyzed how the legal rules governing contractual liability affect the transfer of information between the parties to the by: 2.
Get this from a library. Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information. [Lucian A Bebchuk; Steven Shavell] -- In an earlier work, we analyzed how the legal rules governing contractual liability affect the transfer of information between the parties to the contract.
In particular, we showed how limitations on. In an earlier work, we analyzed how the legal rules governing contractual liability affect the transfer of information between the parties to the contract. In particular, we showed how limitations on contractual liability might lead high valuation buyers to reveal their valuation of performance, and we identified the circumstances under which such limitations on liability are and are not socially by: 2.
Contractual liability and the incentive to reveal information: Responsibility: Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Steven Shavell. Title: Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information Created Date: Z.
Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information by Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Steven Shavell Moral Rules and the Moral Sentiments: Toward a Theory of an Optimal Moral System by Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell.
Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc ; Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (9) See also Journal Article in Journal of Law and Economics ().
Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley V. Baxendale by Lucian Bebchuk & Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis; Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information by.
Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc ; Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and the Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Seperating Control from Cash Flow Rights.
Bebchuk, Lucian & Steven Shavell, Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information (Stanford Law Review, Vol Number 6, Julypages ) The Level of Litigation: Private versus Social Optimality (International Review of Law and Economics, Vol Number 1, Marchpages ) Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No.
This is a National Bureau of Economic Research Paper. NBER charges a fee of $ for this paper. File name: If you wish to purchase the right to make copies of this paper for distribution to others, please select the quantity.
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, "Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information," NBER Working PapersNational Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, "Economic Analysis of Law," NBER Working PapersNational Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Contractual liability is a liability to pay the amount of damage that results from a breach of contract. There is also a second type of liability, delict liability, which concerns compensation for damage caused by specific actions, not for breach of contract terms.
Both types of obligations concern. Books at Amazon. The Books homepage helps you explore Earth's Biggest Bookstore without ever leaving the comfort of your couch.
Here you'll find current best sellers in books, new releases in books, deals in books, Kindle eBooks, Audible audiobooks, and so much more. In this book Steven Shavell provides an in-depth analysis and synthesis of the economic approach to the building blocks of our legal system, namely, property law, tort law, contract law, and criminal law.
Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information, 51 Stan. Rev. Categories. Optimal cleanup and liability after environmentally harmful discharges: The optimal tradeoff between the probability and magnitude of fines: Private versus socially optimal provision of ex ante legal advice: Reconsidering contractual liability and the incentive to reveal information: Rewards versus intellectual property rights.
Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information (with S. Shavell) 51 Stanford Law Review () Abstract Only.
Chapter 11 in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (). Abstract Only. information creates incentive problems of two kinds arise: 1.
Hidden Information (Adverse Selection): Agents may not reveal the state truthfully. A contract in these circumstances tries to elicit agents’ information. This will be Part I of the course. Hidden Action (Moral Hazard): Agents may not deliver on their promises due to imperfect File Size: 1MB.
Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the Incentive to Reveal Information [article] Stanford Law Review, Vol. 51, Issue 6 (July ), pp. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye (Cited times); Shavell, Steven (Cited times).
The paper derives the optimal incentive contract in an agency model with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and limited liability. The analysis introduces a critical ratio, which equals the hazard rate of the shock times the marginal rate of technical substitution of the agent™s e⁄ort for the critical ratio indicates the returns to.
Bebchuk, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Lucian Bebchuk, Lucian A., Bebchuk, Lucian Arye Lucian Bebchuk Finance law scholar. 18) Author A accepts a $5, advance from a publisher and a 10% royalty after 5, books are sold. Author B foregoes the publisher's advance and negotiates for a 15% royalty on all books sold.
Author C decides to self publish his book and keep % of all sales revenue. Which of these authors is most likely to have 10 books published. A) Author A. The Economics of Liquidated Damage Clauses in Contractual Environments with from ECO at University of Toronto, Mississauga.
Reconsidering Mudarabah Contracts in Islamic Finance: What is the Economic Wisdom (Hikmah) of Partnership-based Instruments. Shinsuke Nagaoka Abstract: In Islamic economics and finance, a broad consensus has been reached that, out of all the financial instruments, partnership-based instruments are the.
The TIA route to resolving disputes. This would permit the contractor to evade liability for culpable delay and effectively provide him an incentive to stop issuing programmes for acceptance in the future, in order to avoid future liability for culpable delay.
non-payment or the late provision of information. Whatever the cause, the. A company's commitments (such as signing a contract to obtain future services or to purchase goods) may be legally binding, but they are not considered a liability on the balance sheet until some services or goods have been received.
Commitments (if significant in. If this indifference could be broken in favor of the regulator, then there would be no gain to complement ex ante regulation with ex post liability rules. The joint use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability ensures that the firm has a strict incentive to reveal its information.
Then, Eq. (2) is a strict by: Contract Complexity, Incentives, and the Value of Delegation Journal of Economics Management Strategy, Vol. 6, No. 2 Optimal transfer pricing schemes for work averse division managers with private informationCited by: Many of the most subjective and judgmental valuations recorded by institutions engaged in mortgage origination servicing have increased in use during the years since the economic downturn, mostly due to the potential subjectivity of management assumptions.
Reconsidering management assumptions and related estimates is critical as such a review may help organizations properly reflect. Liability exemptions and limitations need to be argued on a case-by-case basis on both technical grounds (e.g., the impact of rules on the market and the incentives it provides) and policy considerations (e.g., the desirability of a technology even when market forces do not favor it) (see Bertolini ( Bertolini, A.
Cited by: 3. IFRS 17 Business Impacts. How an insurer manages its business will impact how IFRS 17 is applied and implemented. IFRS 17 provides guidance and examples of where judgements and decisions will be based on insurer-specific information and/or circumstances.
How the insurer’s business is managed today impacts the implementation of the accounting. The optimal liability rule trades off providing future injurers with incentives to take precautions and providing the plaintiff with incentives to create information.
David Dranove & Kathryn E. Spier, A Theory of Utilization Review, 2 Contributions to Econ. Motivating with simple contracts In other words, condition (iii) arises due to the fact that the agent must have incentives to reveal truthfully (so that B increases) and to exert effort but it could be optimal in the model in Section when the incentive contract is not flexible enough.
Cited by: 3. contract in an agency model with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and limited liability. We introduce a "critical ratio" that is a function of the agent™s e⁄ort and the random state of the world in the state-space setting.
The critical ratio indicates the returns to providing the agent with incentives. Meet your business tax obligations, lower costs, and avoid tax penalties with our tips and resources on federal, state, payroll, sales taxes as well as everything in between.
Selecting the right type of organizational form for your business requires that you carefully balance tax implications, asset protection, cost-effectiveness and simplicity.
In economics, contract theory studies how economic actors can and do construct contractual arrangements, generally in the presence of asymmetric e of its connections with both agency and incentives, contract theory is often categorized within a field known as Law and prominent application of it is the design of optimal schemes of managerial.
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To the extent that CISG authorises mandatory cure as a matter of buyer choice, the incentive to avoid (cancel) the contract and replace the goods from another source is reduced.
 Buyer's Option to Fix an Additional Period of Time: If the seller is late or has made a non-conforming tender, the buyer 'may fix an additional period of time of.The book-tax accounting gap allows corporations to minimize their earnings for tax purposes while maximizing them in reports to investors, all within the letter of the law.
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